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This article is an edited version of the lecture “Assessing Delay in Infrastructure Arbitration – A Lawyer’s and an Expert’s Perspective”, delivered on 17 November 2026 in the series “Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution III” organised by the Budapest Bar Association and the Hungarian Arbitration Association. The lecture was given jointly by Bence Rajkai and delay expert Bálint László, moderated by Manuela Grosu; this article summarises Bence Rajkai’s contributions.

1. Pick an expert as an expert, or how to choose an expert

The first question to ask is why we need an expert at all. The answer: to prove the facts that we must establish for the tribunal to rule in our favour. What we have to prove, and how, depends on the governing law, the forum and the claim we are pursuing.

It depends on the legal system. Common law and civil law systems obviously approach liability for delay differently. But even within a single legal system, different claims have to be built in entirely different ways.

It depends on the claim. Whether we base our claim on the unforeseeable cost of additional work or on damages determines how we must construct the statement of claim. These legal titles seem to cover cases far apart from one another, yet in substance the same situation often lies behind them: for example, that the contractor – in a way it could not foresee – needed more time to complete the project. And since time is money, this also means that construction cost the contractor more, and it wants to be reimbursed. From the contractor’s point of view the painful reality is the same; from a legal point of view, however, we are dealing with an entirely different task of argument and proof – in essence, two separate cases.

It depends on the procedural framework. The method of proof depends not only on the legal system and the type of claim, i.e. on questions of substantive law, but very much on procedural law as well. Hungarian civil procedure recognises three types of expert evidence: evidence by a party-appointed expert, evidence by an expert appointed in other proceedings (typically notarial proceedings), and evidence by a court-appointed expert. A limit common to all three, however, is that as a rule only experts registered with the Ministry of Justice may be used; ad hoc experts may be engaged only in narrow circumstances.

This rule obviously serves quality assurance. In certain specialised cases, however, it is less a guarantee than a constraint – and delay analysis is certainly one of them. Thorough delay analysis presupposes capacities and expertise that essentially make it a profession of its own, requiring continuous training and knowledge of, and compliance with, international standards. The Hungarian market, however, is too small to build and sustain this expertise. And – so far at least – it has also proved too small and insufficiently profitable for experts working in this field internationally to apply for registration.

In arbitration, by contrast, and especially in international arbitration, one can find and engage experts and firms that specialise in delay analysis and have all the experience and tools needed to carry it out to the appropriate standard. Arbitration may also be better suited to conducting expert evidence and handling concerns and contradictions – think only of experts’ meetings, cross-examination and joint statements.

Last but not least, it depends on the ability and willingness to bear costs. In a dispute worth HUF 100 million, no one is likely to instruct an international expert firm to analyse the project and the delay for two or three months, since the expert’s fees could easily reach, or even exceed, the amount claimed. It is, of course, an interesting dilemma that the complexity of the technical questions does not depend on the amount in dispute, while the expertise of the available experts and the depth and quality of their methods depend heavily on the resources that can be devoted to them. While it seems natural that the parties cannot be expected to advance and bear expert costs disproportionate to the amount in dispute, it would be a provocative – or at least unusual – proposition to calibrate the standard of proof (the level of certainty?) to the value of the claim.

Conclusion. The choice of expert and the framing of the technical questions depend on the legal system, the claim, the procedural framework and the available resources. Most of these, however, are already fixed by the time an expert is actually appointed. That is why determining the method of expert evidence – choosing the expert, if you like – must begin much earlier: when the contract is drafted and the arbitration clause is formulated. Arbitration in itself offers easier access to international expertise, and the rules of expert procedure can also be laid down in the arbitration agreement. Good delay analysis firms are available in the CEE region, interestingly in greater density in Romania and Serbia than in Hungary – possibly owing to the greater international exposure of the construction industry there.

2. Why is delay difficult to examine from a legal point of view?

At first glance, delay does not seem a complicated concept. Nor does it on reading the Hungarian Civil Code (Ptk.):[1] “The obligor falls into delay if it fails to perform the service when due.” (Section 6:153 Ptk.)

Points of dispute. Nevertheless, in delay cases even the application of this concept tends to be disputed, namely

  • whether performance took place on time (whether it was defective or free of defects, fit for its intended use, whether possession was taken);
  • who is liable for the delay;
  • and it is not unusual for the parties to dispute even when the deadline actually expired.

The other side of delay, or rather its counterpart, is where the contractor brings a claim against the employer because, for reasons within the employer’s sphere of responsibility or risk, it could not complete the works on time and therefore incurred additional costs.

Resolving these disputes is made harder by the fact that construction projects are extremely complex processes involving many factors and many actors, made up of interdependent activities that build on one another and conceal risks unlimited in number and kind, whereas the law can capture individual cases only through very limited, predetermined categories. In short: the project happens in processes, but the law thinks in bounded categories.

In law, especially continental law, the input channels through which claims can be pursued are given, and the lawyer’s task is to shape the client’s claim to fit the available options. In Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer explains that understanding, interpretation and application are not successive moments – and he demonstrates this precisely through the example of legal hermeneutics.[2] The application of law is therefore not a process that follows understanding, but an integral and determining part of it.

How we interpret reality depends on the law we apply. A legal system has its own input channels; we lawyers then manufacture the cookie cutters that fit them and use them to cut out pieces of reality to make a statement of facts. Reality is the gingerbread dough: however much and however skilfully we cut, some always remains on the table. The trouble is when the part where our client’s problem lies is exactly the part we cannot reach with the cutters at hand.

Let us take examples using the tools of the Civil Code. If the employer fails to hand over the site, it breaches one of its principal obligations [Section 6:241(1) Ptk.]; this, on the one hand, excludes the contractor’s delay [Section 6:150(2) Ptk.] and, on the other, gives rise to a right to claim damages [Sections 6:241(2) and 6:142 Ptk.]. The right cutter is at hand for this case. Similarly, if additional works are ordered that entail more time and cost, the cutter is at hand. Perhaps it is also at hand where construction is prolonged and becomes more expensive because of additional work that the contractor could not possibly have anticipated.

The leftover. But what if the employer has neither breached the contract nor ordered additional works, and the contractor did not even have to perform physically additional work, yet because of unforeseeable circumstances – say, unexpected ground conditions – it had to reorganise the entire construction process, which prolonged it? What legal title can the contractor then rely on to recover its costs?

  • It is difficult to show a specific breach of contract or wrongdoing on the employer’s side, so a damages claim may be doubtful.
  • In the absence of a change in technical scope, the contractor cannot rely on a claim for additional (ordered) works either.
  • And if no physically unexpected work item arose – the same works have to be performed, only significantly reorganised – it is also awkward to rely on the concept of extra work, because case law has so far been reluctant to conceive of extra work in abstract terms and has applied it mainly where a physically unexpected item of work had to be performed. Reorganisation does not necessarily fit into this.

In such circumstances the contractor’s claim may easily be left on the table. There is, however, no rational business explanation for this distinction. From the perspective of contractual risk allocation, there is no material difference between having to perform physically new work because of an unexpected event and incurring additional costs “only” because of reorganisation. The FIDIC forms do not draw this distinction either: the Red Book allocates unforeseeable ground risk to the employer, the Silver Book to the contractor,[3] but neither recognises the distinction in question. Presumably the Civil Code did not consciously leave this risk on the contractor’s table either – the cutters simply happened to fit together that way.

Options. To keep the contractor’s claim from being left on the table, two things can be done. At the contracting stage, this risk can obviously be regulated and allocated separately. At the claims stage, one can try to knead the dough again: to show, by abstraction, some form of breach by the employer (for example, defective geotechnical data or the lack of a suitable site), or to detach the concept of extra work from the rigid interpretation of “work” applied so far.

Conclusion. The difficulty of legal analysis in delay disputes is that everything is in motion: the interconnected, constantly changing process of the project has to be captured with the static tools of the law. Moreover, reality can only appear through several layers of mediation, since the statement of facts and its expert processing are themselves the product of a construction that examines, measures, compares, discards and brings into the picture numerous alternatives.

3. Clarifying the concepts

Delay. Intuitively, it seems an easily understood concept, but in construction disputes the very fact of delay is typically disputed, not just liability for it (whether performance took place, whether any defect prevented intended use, etc.). The question – and the terminology itself – is further complicated by whether it is possible, or not misleading, to speak of delay when the project could not be completed on time for reasons outside the contractor’s sphere of responsibility.

To resolve this dilemma, Hungarian case law introduced the distinction between objective and subjective delay. Objective delay refers to the factual question of how many days elapsed between the deadline and performance. According to consistent case law, a claim for liquidated damages for delay (késedelmi kötbér) must be assessed starting from the objective delay, i.e. the actual duration of the obligor’s delay, but the employer may charge liquidated damages only for the period of subjective delay falling within the contractor’s sphere of responsibility.[4] The reason is that liquidated damages for delay under Hungarian law are fault-based: in accordance with Section 6:186(1) Ptk., which defines the contractual penalty, the contractor can exonerate itself from the obligation to pay by proving the absence of liability under the formula of Section 6:142 Ptk. The durations of objective and subjective delay may therefore differ.

EOT – extension of time. International contract forms and guidelines oppose the “wait and see” approach. In Hungarian we might aptly call it the “Pató Pál approach”, after the procrastinating squire of Sándor Petőfi’s poem. On many Hungarian projects, issues and disputes are rolled forward towards the end of the project: until then, everyone stockpiles ammunition, and at the end the table is overturned. The problem is that many disputes can no longer be handled efficiently this way.

This is why the SCL Protocol and the FIDIC contract system are built on the philosophy that a dispute should be addressed as soon as it arises: claims should not be stockpiled and kneaded together into global claims, but dealt with separately and promptly, when they arise.[5] This is why FIDIC applies strict time limits for notifying and handling claims, and why both FIDIC and the SCL Protocol place the EOT mechanism at their centre. Its essence is that if the contractor sees that its work will be impeded so that the project cannot be completed on time, it should request an extension within a short time – substantiating the existence and impact of the impediment and demonstrating the extent of the extension required. If the parties cannot agree, under FIDIC contracts the dispute resolution mechanism is triggered while the project is still running.

It can thus be seen that traditional Hungarian practice treats the analysis of the technical and legal effects of delay as a question of liability, i.e. a retrospective, historical question: it takes the delay as a given fact and merely seeks to determine, reactively, which party should bear its consequences. The approach of FIDIC and the SCL Protocol, by contrast, is preventive: it seeks to have the time for completion extended as soon as the impediment arises.

Let us look at a few more international key concepts.

Prolongation. This refers to the extended duration of construction; in essence we are again speaking of the project not being completed on time. Prolongation claims, however, are the counterparts of delay claims: the contractor claims prolongation costs where the construction period has been extended for reasons beyond its control and it has incurred additional costs as a result. Depending on the causes of the prolongation, the contractor may claim these under different legal titles – for example damages, additional works or the unforeseeable cost of extra work.

Acceleration. We speak of acceleration and acceleration costs where the contractor, at extra cost – through overtime, additional labour or equipment – tries to complete the work earlier or by the original deadline. This must be distinguished from mitigation, which is always the contractor’s obligation, even where the delay was caused by the employer. The difference is that the duty to mitigate does not extend to trying to avert the delay at significant additional cost. Reducing delay by deploying significant additional resources and incurring additional costs requires a separate agreement between the parties.

Disruption. A disturbance, hindrance or interruption of the contractor’s normal working methods resulting in lower productivity or efficiency in carrying out the relevant work activities. Claims arising from disruption are extremely difficult to prove; successful disruption claims are very rare even internationally. Under Hungarian law it can also be difficult to find the appropriate legal title: damages and the cost of extra work may come into consideration.

4. The SCL Protocol as a common professional language

The Society of Construction Law (SCL) is an international professional and academic organisation dedicated to promoting education, research and development in construction law. The purpose of its Delay and Disruption Protocol (the SCL Protocol) is to provide a uniform methodology for analysing delays and disruption on construction projects, for establishing entitlement to extensions of time and for valuing additional costs.[6] Although it is neither law nor a standard form of contract, international arbitral tribunals and experts around the world treat it as a point of reference.

The Protocol essentially provides guidance on engineering and expert methodology, but how this guidance applies naturally depends on the contractual framework and legal system in which the project takes place. Mathematics and the engineering sciences generally apply in the same way everywhere, but law – regardless of international contract forms – cannot apply in such a universal way. This gives rise to both a main advantage and a limitation of the SCL Protocol: it offers methods that are useful everywhere, but these must be tailored to the specifics of the particular contract and legal system – meaning not only the particular rules but legal culture in general. A further perennial dilemma is matching engineering and legal jargon to each other.

Even the choice between the SCL Protocol and some other protocol is a dilemma. In international practice, alongside the SCL Protocol (1st edition 2002, 2nd edition 2017), the most frequently encountered are the American AACE International Recommended Practice 29R-03 Forensic Schedule Analysis[7] and the ANSI/ASCE/CI 67-17 Schedule Delay Analysis standard,[8] but the British Chartered Institute of Building (CIOB) Guide to Good Practice in the Management of Time in Major Projects may also serve as a reference.[9] Their approaches differ: the SCL emphasises dispute prevention and the contemporaneous handling of extensions of time, and classifies delays according to which party is responsible for them; the AACE, by contrast, focuses specifically on retrospective, forensic analysis, works with network (CPM) methods, and classifies delays according to whether they are excusable. It is therefore advisable to fix the applicable protocol in the contract, or at the latest when instructing the expert.

Is there a uniform methodology? Or is it like the classic joke: two delay analysts are shipwrecked on a desert island. By the time they are found years later, they have written three protocols. Each wrote one that he swears by, and together they wrote a third that neither of them is willing to apply.

5. Risk and liability

Delay-related construction disputes and the issues arising in them can be described with many different terms. Different contract systems and protocols often use different concepts to describe the same technical or legal issue, although international practice has developed core terms with a more or less universal meaning.

Different words, different approaches. These are not mere words, and the various sets of terms are not mere word clouds, but tools behind which different toolkits and approaches may lie. Depending on the toolkit we use, we approach the same problem in different ways – we interpret reality, the facts, differently, one might say – and we set about resolving the dispute differently.

EOT, for instance, is not just a three-letter acronym but a possible way of handling delay, behind which lies a specific mode of dispute resolution and, more generally, the idea of preventive dispute resolution – or rather, of seeking solutions. By contrast, the conceptual framework developed under the Hungarian Civil Code is entirely reactive: it is not about modifying the time for completion but about determining liability for the missed deadline – essentially, which party can be held liable for the delay that has occurred.

Risk or liability. An equally striking difference between FIDIC and the SCL on the one hand and the Civil Code on the other is that while the former speak of risks and their allocation, Hungarian case law developed under the Civil Code focuses on the concept of liability. Again, this is no mere play on words: fundamentally different approaches lie behind the different words.

FIDIC, drawing on international experience from construction projects, has identified the typical risks and allocates them between the parties according to the contractual concept concerned.[10] The three best-known forms illustrate this logic well.

  • Under the Red Book (Conditions of Contract for Construction), design is the employer’s task, the contractor builds to the employer’s design, and payment is typically based on remeasurement.
  • Under the Yellow Book (Plant and Design-Build), design is also the contractor’s responsibility and the price is a lump sum. Common to both forms is that the risk of unforeseeable physical conditions, such as unexpected ground conditions, is borne by the employer: if such conditions arise, the contractor is entitled to an extension of time and to Cost.
  • The Silver Book (EPC/Turnkey), by contrast, allocates the vast majority of risks, including ground risk, to the contractor. The employer thus gains greater certainty as to price and time, while the contractor typically prices this in as a risk premium.

The colours, then, do not merely mark the covers but stand for risk allocation models. In the FIDIC system, therefore, the primary question regarding delay is not who was at fault, but whose risk the event in question falls within.

6. The FIDIC system

FIDIC’s risk allocation system essentially works with three possible consequences – extension of time (EOT), Cost and Profit – and combines them according to whose sphere of risk the impediment falls within. The organising principle is simple: the more the impediment originates from the employer’s side, the fuller the contractor’s compensation (Sub-Clause references follow the numbering of the 2017 Red Book).[11]

  • If the delay is caused by the employer’s own conduct – for example late access to the site (2.1), late drawings or instructions (1.9), or suspension of the works (8.9–8.10) – time, cost and profit are all due.
  • If a neutral risk allocated to the employer materialises – such as unforeseeable physical conditions (4.12), archaeological and geological findings (4.23), changes in laws (13.6) or exceptional events (18.4) – time and cost are due, but not profit.
  • If the slippage is caused by an event within neither party’s sphere – for example exceptionally adverse climatic conditions [8.5(c)] or delays caused by authorities (8.6) – only time is due: the contractor is relieved of delay damages but bears its own costs.

Variations are priced through a separate channel, under Clause 13, with adjustments to time and price. The difference between the forms is well illustrated by the fact that under the Silver Book neither ground risk (4.12) nor, as a rule, the risk of errors in employer-provided data passes to the employer. A situation that is easily left on the table under the Hungarian Civil Code thus fits into a pre-defined mould under the Red and Yellow Books.

7. The system of the Hungarian Civil Code

The system of the Civil Code, by contrast, is less about allocating risks than about determining liability.

Obligation of result. The basic character of the contract for works (vállalkozási szerződés) and the essence of the contractor’s position lie in its being an obligation of result: the contractor is responsible for ensuring that the result (the work) can be realised as specified in the contract, handed over on time and delivered within the planned costs. Translated into the “language” of risk, this means that, as a rule, the contractor bears all risks relating to the feasibility of the work and to the timing and costs of construction.

From a risk allocation perspective, there are hardly any exceptions to this. Unlike FIDIC, the Civil Code is not about allocating certain risks to the employer, but rather about offering the contractor, at certain points, escape routes from its general contractual obligations and liability. For example, with regard to the feasibility of the work, Section 6:177(2) Ptk. provides a special ground of exemption, say, in the event of a design defect. Section 6:186(1) and Section 6:142 Ptk. allow exoneration from the contractual penalty. And the rules on contractual damages, additional works, extra work and unjust enrichment may enable the contractor to claim reimbursement of the additional costs it has incurred.

Escape routes. Even this list shows, however, that these legal titles are legal institutions quite remote from one another and serving different functions, which may in a given case be suitable for pursuing the contractor’s claims, but are by no means about defining coherent limits to the contractor’s risk. This is where we return to the cookie cutters and the dough left over after cutting. If a claim fits – or can be squeezed – into the available moulds, it may succeed. If it cannot be fitted in at all, it may be left on the table, even though nothing justifies this from a business perspective and the parties may not have intended that, unlike a risk essentially akin to it, it should remain with the contractor.

Conclusion. Under the Civil Code, the contractor bears the general risk of the professional execution of the work. According to the case law of the higher courts, however, this is not unlimited: the risk of shortcomings in project preparation, data provision and financing arising within the employer’s sphere cannot be shifted to the contractor.[12] At the same time, the higher courts are equally clear that the need for additional time does not in itself create a legal basis for claiming a higher contract price. So once again we come back to the point that the contractor’s liability has not so much limits as escape routes – based on legal titles that are otherwise remote from one another and serve different functions.

8. Concurrent delay

We speak of concurrent delay where, during the same period, two independent delaying events affect completion: one falls within the employer’s sphere of risk, the other within the contractor’s, and each would have caused delay on its own. In such cases the “but for” test fails, because neither party can prove that without the other’s event there would have been no delay. What the law makes of this stalemate differs from one legal system to another: the approaches quite literally compete.

The common law follows an “all or nothing” logic. Under the prevention principle, the employer cannot recover liquidated damages for delay it has caused, and since Malmaison English practice has granted a full extension of time. However, the employer’s event must actually delay the works; a merely theoretical effect is not enough: if the project was already in critical delay because of the contractor, subsequent variations caused no actual delay, and the contract may expressly allocate the risk to the contractor. Scotland, by contrast, looks for the dominant cause and, failing one, apportions the delay on a fair and reasonable basis.

Continental legal systems tend to apportion: in Italy, the creditor’s contribution reduces damages; in Austria, delay is apportioned on the basis of the sphere theory, and if the proportion cannot be established, it is split equally; in Germany, it is treated as a question of causation. The lesson is simple: the outcome depends on the legal system, so the issue should be settled in the contract. It is no coincidence that FIDIC 2017, in Sub-Clause 8.5, expressly leaves the rules on concurrent delay to the Special Provisions and, failing these, requires due regard to be had to all relevant circumstances.[13] FIDIC’s guidance recommends precisely the SCL Protocol as a model, under which the contractor’s concurrent delay does not reduce the extension of time to which it is entitled.[14]

Hungary has no specific rule on concurrent delay. The starting point is Section 6:150(2) and Section 6:156(2) Ptk.: the employer’s intermediate breach of contract or creditor’s delay excludes the contractor’s simultaneous delay. Case law, however, applies this not as a general release but as a measured exemption: the contractor is exempted only to the extent and for the period that the employer’s default actually prevented performance.[15] If, owing to its own staff shortages or poor organisation, the contractor would have been in delay irrespective of the impediment, it is liable for the corresponding days.[16] Days of impediment cannot be added up mechanically either: the number of net, excusable days of delay must be determined by critical path analysis.[17]

Where, however, the two causes are genuinely intertwined and the days cannot be cleanly separated, Hungarian law offers two legal institutions: reduction of the contractual penalty (Section 6:188 Ptk.) and contributory conduct of the injured party (Section 6:525 Ptk.). The former allows the penalty, the latter the delay damages, to be apportioned in proportion to the parties’ contributions. The same logic applies on the side of additional costs: the contractor may claim only those costs that arose directly from the employer’s impediment, not the burdens resulting from its own slippage.

9. The FIDIC dispute resolution mechanism and the question marks surrounding it

In the FIDIC system, disputes come to the table not at the end of the project but along the way. The institutional framework for this is the Dispute Avoidance/Adjudication Board (DAAB). That this is not merely of theoretical importance is well illustrated by King’s College London’s 2024 international survey: according to 45% of the individual respondents, the most common outcome of the dispute board’s avoidance measures was that the dispute was avoided completely, and the responses indicate that, in the great majority of cases, no further litigation or arbitration followed the dispute board process.[18]

The nature of FIDIC time limits. To exploit this potential in Hungary as well, however, at least two question marks must be resolved. The first is the nature of FIDIC time limits. According to the contract, failure to meet the 28-day time limits for notifying claims and expressing dissatisfaction results in forfeiture of rights, but Hungarian practice is divided. According to the Győr Court of Appeal, it falls within the parties’ freedom of contract to make the pursuit of claims subject to conditions and to attach forfeiture to non-compliance;[19] an arbitral award, by contrast, held an impossibly short time limit to be invalid.[20] My own view is closer to that of the Győr Court of Appeal: anyone who considers 28 days too short should override it in the contract.

Enforceability of DAAB decisions. The second question is the enforceability of DAAB decisions. If a notice of dissatisfaction is given, the arbitral tribunal may review the DAAB decision in full on the merits; in the absence of one, it essentially decides only on non-compliance with the decision (compliance arbitration). The central question in the Singaporean Persero cases was how a binding but not yet final decision can be enforced under the “pay now, argue later” principle.[21] FIDIC 2017 settled this at the contractual level: under Sub-Clause 21.7, failure to comply with the decision – whether or not a notice of dissatisfaction has been given – may be referred directly to arbitration, and the tribunal may order compliance by way of an interim or provisional measure or an award, with the merits reserved.[22] It remains an open question, however, how such an interim measure or partial award can be enforced under Hungarian law. In the Hungarian environment, a separate compliance arbitration may be the most workable solution, for which UNCITRAL’s 2024 Model Clause on Adjudication also offers guidance.[23]

Conclusion. FIDIC’s sophisticated dispute resolution mechanisms can also be applied in the Hungarian legal environment. Until case law settles the existing uncertainties, they can be managed through deliberate contract drafting: the nature of the time limits and the route to enforcing DAAB decisions should be clearly laid down in the contract itself.

10. Prolongation costs

Types of costs. Finally, let us look at what the contractor can claim if construction has been prolonged for reasons beyond its control. Three typical types of cost can be distinguished.

  • The first is direct cost (“bricks and mortar costs”), which is attributable directly and exclusively to the extended construction period and typically grows in proportion to time: for example, equipment hire charges or the additional monthly salary of a project manager employed solely on this project.
  • The second is price inflation cost: because of the delay, the works are carried out in a more expensive environment. The benchmark here is the price for the planned, weighted midpoint period, not the tender price, since inflation within the original duration is the contractor’s risk. In the absence of data, the construction producer price index of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) may provide guidance.
  • The third is head office overhead, for the calculation of which the Hudson, Emden and Eichleay formulae have become widespread; of these, the SCL Protocol expressly does not recommend the Hudson formula.[24]

Possible legal titles. The formulae, however, only provide the method of calculation, not the legal basis. As we saw at the outset, the same painful reality means a different burden of proof under each legal title, so the individual costs must also be proven according to the logic of the legal title chosen. If, for example, the contractor claims damages on the basis of hindrance by the employer, it must prove its costs as loss and must also classify the heads of loss. Direct costs and additional expenditure due to price inflation typically appear as actual loss (damnum emergens); this requires invoices, accounting records and proof that the cost would not have been incurred without the prolongation.

Head office overhead and profit calculated using the Emden formula, by contrast, are in essence loss of profit (lucrum cessans): the contribution the contractor could have earned on other work. In the case of breach of contract, the foreseeability limit applies to both direct costs and loss of profit: they need to be compensated only to the extent that the contractor proves that the loss was foreseeable, as a possible consequence of the breach, at the time the contract was concluded [Section 6:143(2) Ptk.]. If, on the other hand, the contractor claims not damages but the unforeseeable cost of extra work [Section 6:245(1) Ptk.], this is reimbursement of costs, not loss, so loss of profit cannot be claimed under this title at all.

Summary

The legal assessment of delay disputes is decided on three levels. The first is expert evidence: which expert works, under which protocol and in what procedure is largely decided when the contract and the arbitration clause are drafted. The second is the legal title: the project happens in processes, the law thinks in categories, and whatever does not fit the available cookie cutters is easily left on the table. The third is the mindset: FIDIC and the SCL Protocol think in terms of risks and contemporaneous, preventive solutions, while the practice developed under the Hungarian Civil Code thinks in terms of liability and retrospective settlement of accounts. The international toolkit can be used well in the Hungarian legal environment – but only if the specifics of the legal culture are taken into account at the time of contracting.

AI translation: this English text was translated from the Hungarian original with the help of artificial intelligence.

[1] Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code (Hungary).

[2] Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Igazság és módszer. Egy filozófiai hermeneutika vázlata [Truth and Method]. Transl. Gábor Bonyhai. Budapest, Gondolat, 1984, p. 229 et seq. (subsection “The exemplary significance of legal hermeneutics”).

[3] FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for Construction for Building and Engineering Works Designed by the Employer (Red Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017; FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for Plant and Design-Build for Electrical and Mechanical Plant, and for Building and Engineering Works, Designed by the Contractor (Yellow Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017; FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for EPC/Turnkey Projects (Silver Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017.

[4] BH2019. 225.

[5] Society of Construction Law: Delay and Disruption Protocol. 2nd ed. Hinckley, Society of Construction Law, 2017 (1st ed. 2002). See in particular Core Principle 4 (“Do not ‘wait and see’ regarding impact of delay events”).

[6] Society of Construction Law: Delay and Disruption Protocol. 2nd ed. Hinckley, Society of Construction Law, 2017 (1st ed. 2002). See in particular Core Principle 4 (“Do not ‘wait and see’ regarding impact of delay events”).

[7] AACE International: Recommended Practice No. 29R-03 – Forensic Schedule Analysis. Morgantown, AACE International, 2011.

[8] American Society of Civil Engineers: ANSI/ASCE/CI 67-17 – Schedule Delay Analysis. Reston, ASCE, 2017.

[9] Chartered Institute of Building: Guide to Good Practice in the Management of Time in Major Projects. Dynamic Time Modelling. 2nd ed. Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 2018.

[10] FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for Construction for Building and Engineering Works Designed by the Employer (Red Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017; FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for Plant and Design-Build for Electrical and Mechanical Plant, and for Building and Engineering Works, Designed by the Contractor (Yellow Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017; FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for EPC/Turnkey Projects (Silver Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017.

[11] FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for Construction for Building and Engineering Works Designed by the Employer (Red Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017; FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for Plant and Design-Build for Electrical and Mechanical Plant, and for Building and Engineering Works, Designed by the Contractor (Yellow Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017; FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for EPC/Turnkey Projects (Silver Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017.

[12] Curia Pfv.V.20.909/2017/13.; Szeged Court of Appeal Gf.I.30.313/2012/4.

[13] FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for Construction for Building and Engineering Works Designed by the Employer (Red Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017; FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for Plant and Design-Build for Electrical and Mechanical Plant, and for Building and Engineering Works, Designed by the Contractor (Yellow Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017; FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for EPC/Turnkey Projects (Silver Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017.

[14] FIDIC 2017 Red Book, Guidance for the Preparation of Particular Conditions, guidance on Sub-Clause 8.5; Society of Construction Law: Delay and Disruption Protocol. 2nd ed. Hinckley, Society of Construction Law, 2017, Core Principle 10.

[15] Győr Court of Appeal Gf.II.20.153/2022/8/I.; Budapest Court of Appeal 16.Gf.40.161/2024/9-II.

[16] Budapest-Capital Regional Court 30.G.43.342/2016/102.

[17] Curia Gf.I.30.178/2012.

[18] Nazzini, Renato – Macedo Moreira, Raquel: 2024 Dispute Boards International Survey: A Study on the Worldwide Use of Dispute Boards over the Past Six Years. London, Centre of Construction Law & Dispute Resolution, King’s College London, 2024, pp. 50 and 55 (https://doi.org/10.18742/pub01-203).

[19] Győr Court of Appeal Gf.20.288/2018/6.

[20] Arbitral award No. VB/14019.

[21] CRW Joint Operation v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] SGCA 33 (Persero I); PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK v CRW Joint Operation [2015] SGCA 30 (Persero II).

[22] FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for Construction for Building and Engineering Works Designed by the Employer (Red Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017; FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for Plant and Design-Build for Electrical and Mechanical Plant, and for Building and Engineering Works, Designed by the Contractor (Yellow Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017; FIDIC: Conditions of Contract for EPC/Turnkey Projects (Silver Book). 2nd ed. Geneva, FIDIC, 2017.

[23] UNCITRAL: Model Clauses on Specialized Express Dispute Resolution (2024), Model Clause on Adjudication. Vienna, United Nations, 2024.

[24] Society of Construction Law: Delay and Disruption Protocol. 2nd ed. Hinckley, Society of Construction Law, 2017, Guidance Part B, para. 2 (“Head office overheads and profit”), p. 55 et seq.

Author: Rajkai Bence

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